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The Public’s Interest in the O’Fallon Decision
By L. D. McPherson
Did the supreme court of the United States in its recent opinion 
in the O’Fallon case, which was a test case on railroad valuation, 
decide “ the greatest lawsuit in history ” ? It had been thought in 
many quarters that valuation of railroads would give rise to “the 
greatest lawsuit in history,” and the O’Fallon case, which was 
started in 1924, has been generally discussed as such a case because 
it involved principles for the determination of railroad values and 
operating income applicable to all roads. The O’Fallon decision 
held that the valuation order made by the interstate commerce 
commission must be vacated because no consideration had been 
given the present cost to reproduce the railroad as required by 
the act of congress and the law of the land. The decision did 
not indicate the weight that should be given such cost in deter­
mining value, but indicated that there were, perhaps, many rail­
roads which should be valued far below their present reproduction 
cost. As previous decisions had been consistent with this one, 
the public had generally discounted the probable effect of it as 
rendered. The extent to which the general public may be affected, 
favorably or adversely, by the decision may be best estimated 
by enumeration of some of the interests involved.
EFFECTS OF THE DECISION
Rates will not be increased because of the decision—certainly 
not for several years, or until valuations are finished. Some claim 
that the cost of most railroad property has increased about 85 per 
cent.; others, that the net increase is not more than 40 per cent. 
Under these views the maximum increase in rates that the decision
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could possibly effect would be from 5 to 10 per cent. Therefore, 
this decision could not dominantly influence changes in rates.
The “prudent investment” theory used by the commission in 
the O’Fallon case failed to receive the approval of the supreme 
court. In applying this theory the commission priced and de­
preciated railroad property which had been installed prior to the 
late war without first enhancing its cost for subsequent increases 
in prices. All property added later was considered at actual cost.
The decision should result in cheaper discount and brokerage 
commissions for underwriting the sale of railroad securities, 
because of the reassurance investors receive.
Prosperous railroads, according to the principles upheld, may 
be relieved, to a substantial extent, of paying to the government 
one half of their net railway-operating income in excess of 6 per 
cent. on the value of their property. They are relieved of interest 
on such income until its amount is determined.
There will be continuation, for several years at least, of the 
high expense to the public (so far about $155,000,000), in federal 
taxes and transportation rates, of administering the valuation 
and transportation acts, but even though these expenses seem 
high, there are important uses to be made of the railroad valua­
tions, including regulation of rates, security issues, depreciation, 
accounting, consolidations and recovery of excess railway-operat­
ing income.
The decision may clarify economic thought as to the reasons, 
if any, for differences in valuations for rate regulation, recapture, 
financing, consolidations and taxation.
DECISION MAY AFFECT VALUATION
Legislation will doubtless be advocated on behalf of the public 
to build extensions to national highway systems to provide com­
petition to the railroads. An effort will be made to eliminate as 
arbitrary, fictitious and uneconomic some provisions of the inter­
state commerce act and to propose instead a principle which 
allows railroads a fair return for the services rendered the public. 
A repeal of the provisions for finding or considering reproduction 
 cost in fixing railroad values will probably be sought.
The repeal would not accomplish its object as long as the 
established interpretation of the constitution is followed. Similar 
laws have been held void as an invasion by the legislative branch 
of government into the separate and exclusive domain of the 
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judiciary. If legislation of the type suggested is advocated, the 
railroads may propose amendments to permit determination of 
their net railway-operating income as an average over a reason­
able period of lean as well as prosperous years, instead of for a 
a single year.
The railroads may find it difficult to assemble conclusive 
proof of current or reproductive costs for even the major por­
tions of their property. If the data are available, the serious 
problem of qualifying them as proof of an accurate measure of 
such cost still remains. The railroads may have to prove that 
all their facilities are a present necessity and convenience of 
the transportation plant; that they are efficient, economical and 
adaptable to transportation needs. If such a showing were 
made by railroads, the bureau of valuation of the commission, 
or interveners, might prove the contrary by the data taken from 
the numerous and frequent reports made by the railroads to the 
commission and other governmental agencies. These data may 
include a wealth of statistics as to such features as ill advised 
location, uneconomic grades and curvature, obsolescence in 
equipment, bridges, tunnels, shops and other buildings and struc­
tures, the shifting of traffic to competing forms of transporta­
tion and the probable cost of substituting for the railroad a more 
economical and efficient plant which would be capable of render­
ing the required service. On such showings, conflict in evidence 
might be so great that doubts might be resolved by the commis­
sion against the railroads. If the members of the commission 
agreed, and recited in the valuation order that it had duly consid­
ered all evidence before it, it would be difficult for a railroad to 
reverse that order in court, even in a case where confiscation of 
property was alleged to result. Strength for such a disposition 
of the evidence by the commission is found in the regulation under 
which the renewal or replacement of railroad property as it is 
exhausted, damaged or retired from service is paid for as a current 
railway-operating expense. As prices advanced the increased 
cost of such renewals as are found in the present-day railroad 
would properly have been paid for at these advanced prices from 
the rates collected for service. If rates collectable have not been 
adequate to pay the advances in the costs of renewals plus a 
just contribution to depreciation reserves and a fair return on 
the value of the railway, the failure of the management to collect 
sufficient rates may have been due to economic causes. If the 
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owners, by waiving a fair return, have borne some or all of the 
higher costs of renewals there is more equity in the demand for 
rates to yield a return on the property valued at the present ad­
vanced cost of reproduction. If not, the payment of the higher 
costs by the rate-payers shifts to the owners the burden of proving 
that this is not a duplication of charges.
INCREASED RAILROAD VALUATION STIMULATES OTHER FORMS OF
COMPETITION
The value of railroad property is not insensible to competition 
which has been fostered by federal government aids to shipping 
through the opening and operation of the Panama Canal, through 
intercoastal and inland waterway development and harbor im­
provements, and through the building of highways of more than 
one third the length of all main-line railway mileage. Such 
automobile highways connect with other systems and constitute 
altogether a mileage of three fourths the full length of all railway 
main-line mileage. Motor-bus, motor-truck and private-passen­
ger-automobile operation on these highways has depressed the 
rates and volume of railroad passenger traffic, express, and package 
and less-than-car-load freight, even for long distances. The high­
ways carry much freight that formerly went in car loads. Some 
applications have been granted to reduce passenger train fares 
as much as one half. The commission annually grants numerous 
petitions by railroads for reduction in service and abandonment 
of lines. This causes some compensation to the railroads, as the 
local trains discontinued and the lines abandoned were generally 
unprofitable before competition on the highways was effective. 
However, full consideration of all problems of highway transpor­
tation raises a doubt that it will increase further as competition 
to railroads.
Pipe-line construction has also provided considerable competi­
tion to the railroads. Competition between rail and water car­
riers at many points depresses rates to those common points. 
To avoid discrimination, which is forbidden by law, charges for 
shorter hauls to stations between these common points generally 
can not be higher than for the longer haul to the competitive 
points. This alone has tended to depress rates at nearly all 
stations. Other laws defeat possible economies in transportation, 
such as "full train crew” laws which put unnecessary employees 
on some trains, and franchises, ordinances, contracts, etc., which 
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regulate or interfere with the speed of operation, with station 
stops and with the abandonment of locations for roadway, sta­
tions, shops, etc., which are no longer useful.
On valuation questions many railroad labor unions opposed 
the claims of the owners. Their opposition was apparently based 
on the idea that the less the owners took out of the revenue, the 
more there would be for the workers.
RAILROAD VALUES LESSENED
Changes in conditions due to science and progress apparently had 
not been taken fully into account by the commission and were dealt 
with in the majority opinion in the O’Fallon decision only by in­
ference. In a dissenting opinion emphasis is laid upon the extent 
and effect of obsolescence in decreasing the value of railroad 
property. Most railroads, including many trunk lines, operate 
over grades which were economical only for the traffic and equip­
ment of a generation or two ago. On the other hand, the great 
amount of modern equipment and facilities which has been sub­
stituted for obsolete property by the railroads within the past few 
years has increased the net revenue. Investments for these im­
provements were commended in the dissenting opinion in the 
O’Fallon case. These improved facilities were the means of 
eliminating nearly one seventh of the number of employees 
previously required, and the dissenting opinion indicates that 
much further economy of operation might be effected by retire­
ment of substantial quantities of obsolete facilities still in 
service.
While under the decision the commission can justify a failure to 
value a railroad at or near the current cost of reproduction, a 
valuation at less than such cost might not be justified solely on 
estimated net reductions to be effected in the cost of transporta­
tion by substituting the most modern facilities. It might be 
justified if it were shown that in the operation of modern equip­
ment at or near its capacity over a roadway modernized to meet 
its requirements transportation expenses would be reduced 
enough to pay the increase in fixed charges for financing the im­
provements. Such expensive betterments should be required by 
traffic which has outgrown existing facilities before the latter 
should be depreciated for obsolescence.
While foreclosure prices are not close criteria of the value of 
railroads, the disparity between the present cost of reproduction 
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and the upset or sale price is nearly always great enough to sug­
gest caution in the use of such cost as a measure of value. A 
railroad or a branch or division thereof which would not be useful 
in consolidations and for which honest, economical and efficient 
management over a reasonable period of normal years can show 
no net earnings or other results of operation beneficial to owners, 
is worth little, if anything, more than salvage value. Railroad 
construction that was ill advised, lines which have been built for 
traffic which has been exhausted and lines which are unable to 
hold sufficient remunerative traffic against modern competitive 
forms of transportation constitute considerable railroad mileage 
which should be abandoned.
Much wasteful transportation would be avoided by a discon­
tinuation of service over such lines. The success of local interests 
in delaying the abandonment of such railroads is not generally 
merited by transportation necessity. The abandonment of 
main-line mileage within the past 15 years has greatly exceeded 
the mileage of new construction. Much information as to cause, 
extent and progress of obsolescence in railroad property has been 
accumulated with the increasingly numerous applications filed 
with the commission for the privilege of abandoning railroads or 
reducing service.
These strong reminders of the blight of obsolescence in railroad 
facilities may be expected to affect the judgment of the commission 
in fixing the actual value of the railroads for the purposes of 
rate-making and recapture.
PUBLIC AS A SECURITY OWNER BENEFITED
A benefit to the investing public is the effect of the O’Fallon 
decision to discourage rate reductions. The increased diffusion of 
railroad securities among the general public since the valuation 
was begun has created an interest in supporting higher valuations. 
Interlocked with the interest of these investors is the indirect in­
terest of the great multitude in all occupations and stations in 
life which is substantially affected by dividends received from 
mutual insurance companies, savings banks, trust companies, etc., 
having large holdings in railroad securities.
The commission is not so limited by the decision that it must 
ignore a railroad’s financial structure. If it did this and relied 
exclusively or largely on the current cost of reproduction as the 
measure of a railroad’s ultimate value it would enable stockhold-
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ers who carried the smaller risk to receive the greater profit. 
The borrowers receive all the benefit of an increased valuation, 
the lenders, little. As an incident to the commission’s whole- 
problem of regulation of railroads it can mitigate the burden on 
rates from an increased valuation by reducing the rate of return 
heretofore established by it as fair. It has changed the rate to 
5^4 per cent. If it should find that 4 3/4 per cent. would attract 
the capital needed by railroads when valued at current repro­
duction cost the loss of 1 per cent. would annul approximately 
one fourth of the gain from the increases in the parts of the 
railway value due to changed costs. Practically, such reduced 
rate of return might be difficult for the commission to sustain in 
view of the findings by an eminent economist that a rate of 61/2 
per cent. had necessarily been paid to attract capital required by 
twenty-four representative railroads having established credit.
PRESENT TAXES AFFECT RATES MORE THAN THE DECISION
The O’Fallon decision is not as apt to be the cause of an in­
crease in rates as the taxes now collected, since railway taxes have 
an important bearing on rates. An increase in valuation due to- 
increased cost of reproduction or other cause would be promptly 
used as a basis for increasing railroad taxes. Increases in rail­
road taxes from 1913 to 1928 consumed more than one half of the 
net revenue derived from the shipments of the principal products 
of the soil of the representative agricultural sections of the coun­
try. Within this time taxes on a typical railroad system increased 
to nearly four times as much as they previously were, and now 
consume approximately one half of all gross passenger revenue..
RATES ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE INCREASED
The chief concern of the public is the effect of the decision on 
future rates, although there is no indication that the railroads 
intend to use it as a foundation for wholesale upward revision of 
rates. No one wishes to establish rates so high that they will 
check production or transportation of goods or retard the pros­
perity of the territory served.
It is rather to the interest of all railroads to attract new and 
regain lost traffic. About twenty years ago the United States 
supreme court decided that it was the duty of public-utility 
managements to collect rates that would pay a fair return on the 
property used in the service and would provide the cost of re- 
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placement of items of property when their usefulness was ex­
hausted in service. The managements of many public utilities 
could not fully enforce this right. Others would not attempt it. 
The decision in the O’Fallon case is even a less definite and posi­
tive grant of power to public-utility managements. Rates high 
enough to pay a fair return on the current cost of reproduction of 
all railroads are not likely to be enforced now for the same or 
equally good reasons. Railroads make their money out of the 
growth of gross earnings over a long period (heretofore averaging 
about four per cent. per annum) and by their ability to reduce 
operating expenses. These considerations indicate that rates 
should gradually decline. Significant among the economies for­
merly available to railroads, but realized more fully in recent 
years, are the savings in rentals paid by one railroad on the cars of 
another. Floodlights in freight yards permit operation for 
twenty-four hours every day and this has greatly increased the 
mileage per diem of cars and locomotives. The reduced number 
of cars required for the larger volume of freight avoided the 
consequences of car shortages. Mileage between locomotive 
terminals has also been greatly increased.
One analysis of the effect of the O’Fallon decision on railroad 
rates, if reproduction costs are taken as the sole measure of the 
value of railroad property, shows that the probable increase in 
rates required would range between 5 and 10 per cent., the varia­
tions being due to differences in conclusions regarding the real in­
crease in costs. This estimate is made from calculations in which 
the commission’s tentative valuation of all railroads as of 1920 
was the basic figure. From this latter figure deductions were 
made for land, working capital and intangibles to obtain the 
amount which represented that part of the property which would 
be affected by the fluctuations in costs which were in controversy 
in the O’Fallon case. This fluctuating part of the railroad cost 
was raised to current cost by multiplying by index numbers. 
Non-depreciable property included in this new cost was deducted 
to obtain the sum to be depreciated, from which depreciation was 
deducted. To the present cost of such fluctuating property, 
depreciated, were added intangibles, working capital, additions 
and betterments (since 1920) and non-depreciable property, 
including land, to obtain the ultimate value by giving full weight 
to increased costs. A return at the rate of 5^ per cent. on this 
ultimate value was computed. It produces a sum to provide 
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which at a conservative estimate would require payment of rates 
from 5 to 10 per cent, higher than those collected in 1928.
General increases to this extent in all rates would be difficult 
to effect in periods of comparative economic stability. As a 
result of the general disturbance in prices incident to the world 
war the commission in 1920 increased freight rates from 25 per 
cent. to 40 per cent., and passenger rates 20 per cent. following a 
previous increase of 40 per cent. Business did not then readily 
adjust itself to such great changes. Gross revenue rose in 1921, 
varying from 59 per cent. to 96 per cent. Reductions were sought 
by both shippers and travellers, and to a considerable extent by 
railroads. In 1921 rates on farm products were reduced 10 per 
cent. or more. In 1922 the commission ordered a general reduc­
tion on all other freight amounting to 10 per cent. Further 
reductions in 1923 lowered rates approximately 5 per cent. 
more. Lowering of railroad revenue per ton-mile and per passen­
ger-mile has since continued from year to year. These reductions 
occurred because of actual or potential competition, despite the 
commission’s recognition of its obligation under the law to estab­
lish remunerative rates and its denial of many railroads’ applica­
tions for permission to reduce rates substantially.
The influence of the O’Fallon decision may be relegated to a 
minor place by the unavoidable lapse of time before the commis­
sion can make ultimate valuation of the railroads. Or its 
influence may be minimized by increased economies in transpor­
tation by railroads and their competitors; by other economic 
causes including the shifting of general price levels and cost of 
railroad construction and equipment; by changes in the laws 
or their administration, or by railroad labor agreements.
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